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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
As originally set forth in Appellant's Brief, this is a 
Workman's Compensation case involving the claim of a dependent 
spouse for death benefits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No additional facts are necessary for a determination of the 
issues in this matter. Appellant relies on her original Statement 
of Facts. 
No. 860215-CA 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The "dependency standard" in Utah is far broader than the 
dependency standards set forth in the cases from foreign juris-
dictions relied upon by Respondents. Appellant was a dependent 
spouse at the time of her husband's death. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CASES RELIED UPON BY RESPONDENTS ARE EITHER 
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE PRESENT CASE OR 
SUPPORTIVE OF APPELLANT'S POSITION 
With the exception of Hancock, et al v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 198 P.169 (1921), the cases cited by 
Respondents are either irrelevant or distinguishable, and 
Appellant should be awarded her statutory death benefits of 
$30,000.00. 
The Hancock, supra., case cited by Respondent Default 
Indemnity Fund, establishes and explains the Utah test of depen-
dency. Although the facts in that case do not fit the present 
situation, the law does. That test of dependency was based upon 
the Delaware case of In Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v. Palmatory, 7 
Boyce (Del.) 105 ATL, at page 418, quoting: 
fIt is not sufficient that the contributions 
of the employe were used in paying the living 
expenses of the claimant, but it must be 
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shown that the contributions of the employe 
were relied upon by the dependent for his or 
her means of living judging this by the class 
and position of life of the dependent.f 
* * * 
'However, test of dependency, generally 
speaking, is whether the claimant relied upon 
the employe's contributions for his support-
ing wholly or partially judging this by what 
would be reasonable living expenses for 
persons in the same class and position. 
Support as used within the meaning of the 
statute is of a broader import than food, 
clothing and shelter, and may include all 
such means of living as would enable the 
claimant to live in a style and condition and 
with a degree of comfort suitable and becoming 
to his station in life.' Id. 
This same philosophy was again approved in the Utah case of 
Farnsworth v. Industrial Commission, 534 P.2d 897 (Utah 1975): 
. . . dependency within the terms of the 
statute does not mean absolute dependency for 
the necessities of life, but rather that the 
applicant looked to and relied on the con-
tributions of the workman in whole or in part 
as a means of supporting and maintaining 
himself in accordance with his social posi-
tion and accustomed mode of life. Id., at 
899. 
The foreign cases relied upon by Respondents adhere to a 
more narrow interpretation of the word "support" and are not as 
broad as the Utah standard. For example, in Penn Sanitation Co. 
v. Hoskins, 10 P.Cmwlth. 528, 312 A.2d 458 (1973), cited by 
Respondents Revlon Service, Inc. and Liberty Mutual, the Court 
concluded it was bound by a support order entered five weeks 
earlier, which provided only for the couple's two children. 
Because the support order was acquiesced in by the wife, she was 
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not entitled to claim she had been supported by her deceased 
husband for purposes of dependency under the Workman's 
Compensation statute. 
Likewise, S & S Associates, Inc. v. WCAB (Hochman), 465 A.2d 
57 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1983) , cited by the same Respondents, is too 
narrow an interpretation. The case is also distinguishable on 
the facts. Although the Claimant in that case was also relying 
on the fact that her deceased husband was paying the mortgage 
payments, the parties had been separated for almost three years 
and had established separate lives for themselves. The decedent, 
Mr. Hochman, was living in the parties' house with another woman, 
and Mrs. Hochman was living in an apartment in Boston with her 
daughter whom she was supporting, and she sought no support order 
for her husband during this period. They both worked and paid 
their own expenses. In light of these facts, the court felt that 
mortgage payments were not support and reversed the Workman's 
Compensation Appeal Board. 
The Colorado case of City of Aurora v. Claimant in Death of 
Corr, 689 P.2d 659 (Colo.App. 1984), cited by Respondents Revlon 
Service, Inc. and Liberty Mutual, involved a factual situation 
where each party had been paying his or her own living expenses 
while each was earning equal salaries. The facts in Aurora, 
supra., do not indicate the amount or nature of the joint obli-
gations which were incurred in the marriage, nor the ability of 
the claimant to pay those obligations. The Colorado court, 
stating there were not enough facts to support the Commission's 
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decision to grant the claimant relief, reversed the Commission 
and affirmed the hearing officer's order, which initially denied 
the petition. These foreign cases may illustrate one point - that 
the question of support or dependency, as it relates to the 
payment of debts of the parties, is a factual question and not a 
question of law. 
In the instant case, the Dahls1 lives had not become as 
separate and distinct as the three-year separation in Hochman, 
supra, and the parties had substantial liabilities. The payments 
by Mr. Dahl toward their joint debts and mortgage was a primary 
concern of Mrs. Dahl. In fact, she gave up her claim to 
temporary support of $750.00 in exchange for Mr. Dahl agreeing to 
assume the mortgage and other financial obligations of the 
parties. Prior to that understanding, she even contributed 
$200.00 per month for a period of three months to assist her 
husband in the payment of these debts. It is undisputed that 
Mrs. Dahl was unable on her salary to make the $800.00 per month 
mortgage payments and that she was $5,000.00 in arrears in the 
payments when this matter was presented to the Industrial 
Commission. 
The 1984 joint tax return indicates the total earnings of 
the parties of $59,286.99 [Respondents1, Default Indemnity Fund 
and Industrial Commission of Utah, Brief, Appendix 3]. This was 
the standard that allowed Appellant and her husband to live in 
the style and condition suitable to their station in life as 
referred to in the Utah cases of Hancock and Farnsworth, supra. 
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Being solely obligated to pay the mortgage and other debts was 
the reality which claimant had to face upon the death of her 
husband. In reference to Mrs. Dahl's returning to the home after 
the death of her husband, Respondent's, Default Indemnity Fund, 
Brief states: "This self imposed and created burden should not 
obliterate the intent and meaning of fa most beneficent law1" 
[Respondent's Brief, P. 15]. Can it be said that a threatened 
mortgage foreclosure, deficiency judgment and possible bankruptcy 
are "self imposed?" This "most beneficent law" should and must 
take into account the realty of the parties1 intertwined obliga-
tions which were incurred during the course of the marriage and 
were present at the time of Mr. Dahl's death and upon which 
claimant was jointly liable. It should make due allowance for 
that loss when one of the joint obligors ceases to make his 
agreed monthly contribution to the joint debts and obligations of 
the parties. Contrary to Respondents' contentions, this form of 
dependency is real and not imaginary. 
The Administrative Law Judge did not want to hear about the 
financial difficulties Mrs. Dahl was having as a result of her 
husband's failure to pay the mortgage payments. He sustained 
counsel Pixton's objections to that evidence who stated, as part 
of her objection: "Her [Mrs. Dahl's] expenses today I think are 
totally irrelevant to her dependency on August 1" [R-52]. His 
view of the overall case was simply erroneous and did not follow 
established Utah law. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Administrative Law Judge, applied a narrow view of 
dependency and erroneously disregarded the Utah law as set forth 
in the cases of Hancock and Farnsworth, supra. The Industrial 
Commission, affirming that decision, was also reversible error, 
and the decision of the Industrial Commission should be reversed 
and Appellant be awarded the $30,000.00 death benefit to which 
she is entitled as the spouse of the decedent under the Workmanfs 
Compensation statutes. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J day of March, 1987. 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
IK J. GUSTIN J 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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